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WHEN A DOOR CLOSES, A WINDOW OPENS: USING
PREEMPTION TO CHALLENGE STATE MEDICAID CUTBACKS
MARTINA BRENDEL*
INTRODUCTION
Medicaid is a federal-state spending program that provides medical
assistance to over fifty million low-income and medically needy Americans
each year.1 The current economic downturn is causing more Americans to
enroll in Medicaid at a time when state tax revenues are in decline, contri-
buting to state budget shortfalls in the billions of dollars. 2 Another sixteen
million people are expected to enroll in Medicaid during the next decade as
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act takes effect, though most of
the costs associated with this expansion will be borne by the federal gov-
ernment. 3 Nevertheless, nearly every state is making cuts to its Medicaid
program to control costs. 4 Last year alone, thirty-nine states reduced or
froze provider reimbursement rates, prompting some providers to leave the
Medicaid system.5 Of those thirty-nine states, fifteen also reduced or elimi-
* J.D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2011. Notes and
Comments Editor, Chicago-Kent Law Review. The author thanks Professor Mark Rosen for his encou-
ragement and support of this article and Paul Forster for his invaluable comments and guidance
throughout the writing process.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2006); KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID
ENROLLMENT: JUNE 2010 SNAPSHOT 1 (Feb. 2011), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8050-
03.pdf(noting that 50.3 million Americans were enrolled in the Medicaid Program in June 2010).
2. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID'S CONTINUING CRUNCH IN
A RECESSION: A MID-YEAR UPDATE FOR STATE FY 2010 AND PREVIEW FOR FY 2011 1, 5 (Feb.2010)
[hereinafter MEDICAID'S CONTINUING CRUNCH], http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8049.pdf.
3. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, FINANCING NEW MEDICAID COVERAGE
UNDER HEALTH REFORM: THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND STATES I (May 2010),
http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8072.pdf.
4. A Kaiser Commission survey of Medicaid directors conducted in fall 2009 revealed that 44
states were considering eliminating programs, reducing provider reimbursement rates, and exploring
other cost-control measures to balance their annual budgets. See MEDICAID'S CONTINUING CRUNCH,
supra note 2, at 7.; see also Kevin Sack & Robert Pear, States Consider Medicaid Cuts as Use Grows,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2010, at Al, available
athttp://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/19/us/politics/19medicaid.html.
5. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE CRUNCH CONTINUES: MEDICAID
SPENDING, COVERAGE AND POLICY IN THE MIDST OF A RECESSION 30 (Sept. 2009) [hereinafter THE
CRUNCH CONTINUES], http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7985.pdf; see also Kevin Sack, As Medica-
id Payments Shrink, Patients are Abandoned, N.Y.TIMES, Mar. 15, 2010, at Al,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/16/health/policy/16medicaid.html.
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nated benefits such as dental, vision, and mental health services. 61n Arizo-
na, the budget situation is so dire that legislators recently cut funding for
certain organ transplants in an effort to contain costs. 7
Medicaid patients and providers have brought lawsuits alleging that
these cuts violate the Medicaid Act.8 Whether individual plaintiffs have
standing to enforce the Act, however, has been called into question in re-
cent years. 9 Historically, Medicaid plaintiffs have brought suit to enforce
the Medicaid Act under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.10 In 2002, however, the Su-
preme Court in Gonzaga University v. Doe significantly limited the availa-
bility of § 1983 as a cause of action in cases involving Spending Clause
statutes.I1 Consequently, circuits have discontinued § 1983 enforcement of
two important Medicaid provisions: the "reasonable standards" provisionl2
and the "equal access" provision.13 Additionally, several circuits have in-
terpreted "medical assistance" under the Medicaid Act to mean only "fi-
6. See THE CRUNCH CONTINUES, supra note 5, at 65, 74-75.
7. See Marc Lacey, Arizona Cuts Financing for Transplant Patients, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2010,
at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/03/us/03transplant.html.
8. This note discusses just a handful of the hundreds of lawsuits brought by individual plaintiffs
against state officers. See Jane Perkins, Q & A: Responding to Medicaid Home and Community Based
Service Cutbacks, NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM (Feb. 2009),
http://www.healthlaw.org/images/pubs/QAHCBWcuts_02-09.pdf (noting that nearly 100 published
federal and state court cases have discussed cutbacks in Medicaid coverage of home and community
based services alone); see also MEDICAID'S CONTINUING CRUNCH, supra note 2, at 7-8 (noting that
"[I]itigation in California has prevented the implementation of provider rate reductions that were pro-
posed in the prior fiscal yearbudget further contributing to the deficit in the current year.").
9. See PhRMA v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 675 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the
appropriate remedy for violations of the Medicaid Act is termination of federal funding and that Medi-
caid beneficiaries should be foreclosed from suing to enforce the Medicaid Act under § 1983 and the
Supremacy Clause);1d at 681-83 (Thomas, J., concurring).
10. See, e.g., Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 524 (1990) (holding that the Boren
Amendment to Medicaid Act created a substantive federal right enforceable by health care providers
under § 1983).
11. 536 U.S. 273, 290-91 (2002) (holding that the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of
1974 does not give rise to personal rights enforceable under § 1983).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(A)(17). For cases holding that the "reasonable standards" provision is
unenforceable under§ 1983, see Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 509 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that
the "reasonable standards" provision is unenforceable under § 1983) and Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d
1152, 1162 (9th Cir. 2006).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A). Several cases have held that the "equal access" provision is
unenforceable under § 1983.See Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins, 509 F.3d 697, 703 (5th Cir.
2007); Ball v. Rodgers, 492 F.3d 1094, 1102 (9th Cir. 2007); Okla. Chapter of Am. Acad. of Pediatrics
v. Fogarty, 472 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007); Mandy R. ex. rel Mr. & Mrs. R. v. Owens, 464 F.3d
1139, 1148 (10th Cir. 2006); Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 542 (6th Cir. 2006); San-
chez ex. rel. Hoebel v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 2005); Long Term Care Pharm.
Alliance v. Ferguson, 362 F.3d 50, 59 (1st Cir. 2004); but see Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark.
Dep't of Human Servs., 443 F.3d 1005, 1015-16 (8th Cir. 2006)(holding that the "equal access" provi-
sion is enforceable -under § 1983), vacated as moot sub nom. Selig v. Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc., 551
U.S. 1142 (2007).
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nancial assistance."1 4 According to these courts, the Medicaid Act does not
oblige states to provide services, only to reimburse providers for services
when presented with the bill.15 Together, these precedents give rise a situa-
tion where states may eliminate services and lower reimbursement rates
without fear of liability under § 1983.16
Despite these setbacks, new developments in the area of federal
preemption1 7 give Medicaid plaintiffs and advocates reason to be optimis-
tic. In 2006, the Eighth Circuit held that the "reasonable standards" provi-
sion of the Medicaid Act may be enforced under the Supremacy Clause of
the U.S. Constitution where it conflicts with state law.18 Similarly, in 2008,
the Ninth Circuit held that the "equal access" provision of the Medicaid
Act may be enforced under the Supremacy Clause, even though it is not
enforceable under § 1983.19 As more states scale back their Medicaid pro-
grams to contain costs, they can expect increased litigation under the Su-
premacy Clause to enforce these provisions.20
Although the Supremacy Clause has emerged as a promising alterna-
tive to § 1983 in suits to enforce the Medicaid Act, the Supremacy Clause
is not without its limits. 21 First, Supremacy Clause actions permit only
prospective relief, whereas § 1983 allows plaintiffs to collect private dam-
ages.22 Second, while it is clear that federal law preempts conflicting state
laws and regulations, relatively few courts have considered whether federal
law preempts informal state rules, such as reimbursement rates. 23 Finally,
Justices Scalia and Thomas's concurring opinions in PhRMA v. Walsh sug-
14. See Fogarty, 472 F.3d at 1214; Mandy R., 464 F.3d at 1143; Westside Mothers, 454 F.3d at
540; Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 324 F.3d 906, 910 (7th Cir. 2003); but see Bryson v. Shumway, 308
F.3d 79, 81, 88-89 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding implicitly that "medical assistance" means actual services);
Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 714, 717 (11th Cir. 1998) (same).
15. See, e.g., Bruggeman, 324 F.3d at 910 (holding that Illinois was under no obligation to provide
intermediate care facilities for people with mental retardation in the Chicago area).
16. See, e.g., Fogarty, 472 F.3d at 1214 (denying relief under § 1983 to plaintiffs who alleged that
they were unable to obtain services due to low provider reimbursement rates).
17. Preemption is a judicially-created doctrine, based on the Supremacy Clause, that gives federal
law priority over state law where the two conflict. See U.S. Cont. art.VI; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1
(1864).
18. Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 509-10, 512-13 (8th Cir. 2006).
19. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal. v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 1050, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 2008).
20. See MEDICAID'S CONTINUING CRUNCH, supra note 2, at 7-8 (noting that litigation in Califor-
nia has "made many Medicaid officials believe that the ability of states to control their expenditures is
now extremely limited").
21. See Rochelle Bobroff, Section 1983 and Preemption: Alternative Means of Court Access for
Safety Net Statutes, 10 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 27, 74-75 (2008) (discussing limits of Supremacy Clause
compared to § 1983).
22. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of L.A., 493 U.S. 103, 119 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dis-
senting).
23. See discussion infra Part III.B.
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gest that the Court may be open to examining whether the Supremacy
Clause should be used to enforce the Medicaid Act at all. 24
Part I of this Note will provide an overview of the Medicaid program
and discuss how Gonzaga and other decisions have impacted plaintiffs'
ability to enforce Medicaid provisions using § 1983. Part II will discuss the
preemption doctrine and two circuit court cases holding that plaintiffs may
sue under the Supremacy Clause to enforce Medicaid provisions no longer
enforceable under § 1983. Part III will examine the limits of the preemption
doctrine, which applies to a narrower range of state actions than § 1983. It
will argue that Medicaid reimbursement rates are "laws" within the mean-
ing of the Supremacy Clause and therefore should be preempted where they
conflict with Medicaid's "equal access" provision. Finally, it will conclude
by observing that litigation alone is not a solution to the problem of state
Medicaid cutbacks. States must improve the efficiency of their Medicaid
programs and look for additional revenue streams if the cuts are to subside.
I. MEDICAID ENFORCEMENT UNDER § 1983
A. Medicaid: An Overview
Enacted in 1965 under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, Medicaid
is the third-largest social program in the federal budget, after Social Securi-
ty and Medicare. 25 Unlike Medicare, which receives funding primarily
through federal payroll taxes placed in trust, Medicaid receives funding
from federal grants matched by the states.26 Furthermore, while the federal
government directly administers Medicare, the states administer Medicaid
under the supervision of the federal Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS). 27 Participation in the Medicaid program is voluntary, but
all 50 states participate. 28 Participating states must provide certain mini-
mum services, but beyond that they may customize their programs accord-
ing to their specific needs. 29 Once a state finalizes its Medicaid program,
24. See 538 U.S. 644, 675 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring); Id. at 681-83 (Thomas, J., concurring).
25. Federal spending on Medicaid in the 2009 fiscal year totaled $251 million, compared to $678
for Social Security and $425million for Medicare. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, THE
BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011149, available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fyl I /pdf/summary.pdf.
26. See OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 2008
ACTUARIAL REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL OUTLOOK FOR MEDICAID 3 (2008), available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/ActuarialStudies/downloads/MedicaidReport2008.pdf
27. Id. at 2-3.
28. See KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID: A PRIMER 4 (2009)
[hereinafter MEDICAID: A PRIMER], available at http:/Iwww.kff~org/medicaid/upload/7334-03.pdf.
29. Id. at 10.
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which it submits to CMS in the form of a "state plan," the state is bound by
the terms of the plan and may alter them only by amendment.30
This cooperative federal-state framework is advantageous because it
allows states to individualize their Medicaid programs while also diffusing
the cost of providing health care to low-income and medically needy indi-
viduals. However, this framework also has its drawbacks. Unlike the feder-
al government, which may carry a deficit from year to year, nearly every
state is required (by constitution or by statute) to balance its budget. 31Con-
fronted with the rising cost of health care, states are pressed to find addi-
tional revenue streams or to cut services. 32 Federal oversight of the
Medicaid program has proved difficult.33 Twenty-six states have exploited
the program by paying nursing homes and hospitals above the established
Medicaid rate and then requiring the providers to return the excess pay-
ments to the state. 34 Many more states have responded to the rising cost of
healthcare by reducing or eliminating services, prompting numerous law-
suits in the past decade.35
The Medicaid Act lays out seventy-three separate requirements with
which a state plan for medical assistance must comply to receive federal
funds.36 This Note will limit its discussion to four commonly litigated pro-
visions: the "reasonable promptness" provision, the "comparability" provi-
sion, the "reasonable standards" provision, and the "equal access"
provision. The "reasonable promptness" provision requires that medical
assistance "be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individ-
uals." 37 The "comparability" provision requires that the "amount, duration,
30. See 42 C.F.R. § 430.12(c) (2010) (describing state plan amendment procedure); Bryson v.
Shumway, 308 F.3d 79, 89 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting that while states exercise great discretion in fashion-
ing their state plans, once they submit the plan to CMS, they are bound by its terms); Doe v. Chiles, 135
F.2d 709, 714 (11 th Cir. 1998).
31. See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS:
GROWING FISCAL CHALLENGES WILL EMERGE IN THE NEXT 10 YEARS 7 (2008), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08317.pdf
32. See id at 5, 11-12 (discussing rising costs of healthcare); see also OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY,
supra note 26, at i (same).
33. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAID FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: BETTER
OVERSIGHT OF STATE CLAIMS FOR FEDERAL REIMBURSEMENT NEEDED 1 (2002), available at
http://www.gao.gov/ new.items/d02300.pdf.
34. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAID: IMPROVED FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF STATE
FINANCING SCHEMES IS NEEDED 14 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04228.pdf..
35. Between 2000and 2009, "nearly 100 published state and federal court cases have discussed
cutbacks in Medicaid coverage."Perkins, supra note 8.
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2006).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8). This provision requires that a state plan for medical assistance must
"provide that all individuals wishing to make application for medical assistance under the plan shall
have opportunity to do so, and that such assistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all
eligible individuals." Id.
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or scope" of medical assistance be equal for all eligible individuals. 38The
"reasonable standards" provision requires that states establish "reasonable
standards . . . for determining eligibility for and the extent of medical assis-
tance." 39 Lastly, the "equal access" provision requires that provider pay-
ments be economical and sufficient to enlist providers into the Medicaid
program. 40 Although these provisions operate independently, the non-
enforcement of one provision impacts the force of the others, as the follow-
ing sections will show.
B. Medicaid and § 1983
Section 1983 imposes liability on a person who, "under color of any
[state] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage," deprives another
person "of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws." 41 In 1980, the Supreme Court recognized that § 1983 confers a
private right on individuals to sue to enforce federal statutes.42 In Blessing
v. Freestone, the Court set forth a three-part test for determining whether a
statute confers a private right enforceable under § 1983: "[f]irst, Congress
must have intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff';
second, the asserted right must not be so "vague and amorphous" that its
enforcement would strain the courts; and "third, the statute must unambi-
guously impose a binding obligation on the States."43
In Gonzaga University v. Doe, the Supreme Court substantially li-
mited the availability of § 1983 as a cause of action for plaintiffs asserting
violations of federal statutes, holding that nothing "short of an unambi-
guously conferred right" will support a cause of action under § 1983.44 The
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10). This provision requires that a state plan for medical assistance must
make medical assistance available to all eligible individuals and provides that "the medical assis-
tance ... shall not be less in amount, duration, or scope than the medical assistance made available to
any other such individual" receiving services under the plan. Id § 1396a(a)(10)(B).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A). This provision requires that a state plan for medical assistance
"provide such methods and procedures relating to the utilization of, and the payment for, care and
services available under the plan .. .as may be necessary to safeguard against unnecessary utilization of
such care and services and to assure that payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality
of care and are sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and services are available under the
plan at least to the extent that such care and services are available to the general population in the
geographic area."
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For an extensive discussion of § 1983 as a cause of action for enforcing
federal statutes, see generally Bobroff, supra note 21.See also Julia Gilmore Gaughan, Comment,
Institutionalization as Discrimination: How Medicaid Waivers, the ADA, and § 1983 Fail56U. KAN. L.
REv. 405, 418-26 (2008).
42. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1980).
43. 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997).
44. 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002).
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plaintiff in Gonzaga was a former university student who sued under
§ 1983, alleging violations of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act (FERPA).45 The Court held that although the analysis for whether a
statute is enforceable under § 1983 differs in important respects from the
analysis for whether a statute contains an implied right of action, both re-
quire that "Congress intended to create a federal right."46 The Court con-
cluded that the relevant provisions of FERPA were couched in language
with "an aggregate, not individual, focus" and therefore held that FERPA
did not give rise to a federal right enforceable under § 1983.47
Following Gonzaga, circuits have generally allowed § 1983 enforce-
ment of federal statutory provisions that are framed in terms of individuals,
but they have been reluctant to enforce statutory provisions containing
broad directives or referring only to the obligations of government agen-
cies. 48 In the Medicaid context, the federal appellate courts that have consi-
dered the issue agree that plaintiffs may use § 1983 to enforce the
"reasonable promptness" provision, which requires states to furnish medi-
cal assistance "with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals." 49
Similarly, the circuits have permitted § 1983 enforcement of the "compara-
bility" provision, which requires states to make medical assistance availa-
ble to "all eligible individuals " in the same amount, duration, and scope as
other eligible individuals. 50 However, five circuits have refused to allow
§ 1983 enforcement of the "equal access" provision, which requires that
provider payments be economical but also sufficient to enlist providers into
the Medicaid system. 51 These courts have based their decisions on the pro-
vision's lack of rights-creating language and on its failure to identify a
discrete class of beneficiaries. 52 Similarly, two circuits have held that plain-
45. Id. at 276-77.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 290.
48. See Bobroff, supra note 21, at 62-63.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) (2006); see Doe v. Kidd, 501 F.3d 348, 356 (4th Cir. 2007); Sabree ex
rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 190 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Mandy R. ex. rel. Mr. & Mrs. R. v.
Owens, 464 F.3d 1139, 1142-43 (10th Cir. 2006) (assuming without deciding that the "reasonable
promptness" provision is enforceable under § 1983).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10).;see also Mandy R., 464 F.3d 1142-43; Westside Mothers, 454 F.3d
at 539; S.D. ex rel. Dickson v. Hood, 391 F.3d 581, 603 (5th Cir. 2004); Sabree ex rel. Sabree, 367 F.3d
at 189-90.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1392a(a)(30)(A); see Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins, 509 F.3d 697,
703 (5th Cir. 2007); Mandy R., 464 F.3d at 1148; Westside Mothers, 454 F.3d at 542-43; Sanchez ex
Rel. Hoebel v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005); Long Term Care Pharm. Alliance v.
Ferguson, 362 F.3d 50, 58-59 (1st Cir. 2004).
52. See e.g. Long Term Care Pharm. Alliance at 57 ("Subsection (30)(A), unlike subsection
(13)(A), has no 'rights creating language' and identifies no discrete class of beneficiaries-two touch-
stones in Gonzaga's analysis . . ."). The Eighth Circuit is the only circuit to hold post-Gonzaga that the
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tiffs may not use § 1983 to enforce the "reasonable standards" provision of
the Medicaid Act, noting that it focuses on the "aggregate practices of the
states" rather than individual entitlements. 53
C. "Medical Assistance" as "Financial Assistance"
Another development affecting § 1983 enforcement of the Medicaid
Act is the trend among the circuits to interpret "medical assistance" under
the Medicaid Act to mean only "financial assistance." According to this
view, a state complies with the "reasonable promptness" provision 54 of the
Medicaid Act simply by providing reasonably prompt payment for whatev-
er services it decides to offer.55 A state is not obliged to provide medical
services in areas where no providers offer them. 56 Similarly, a state com-
plies with the "comparability" provision of the Medicaid Act 57 simply by
paying for services once they are rendered, rather than ensuring that all
eligible individuals have access to comparable services.58
The Seventh Circuit in Bruggeman v. Blagojevich was the first court
to define "medical assistance" as "financial assistance." 59 Prior to Brugge-
man, the prevailing view among the circuits was that "medical assistance"
meant actual medical services. 60 The Seventh Circuit in Bruggeman re-
jected this interpretation, holding that "Medicaid is a payment scheme, not
a scheme for state-provided medical assistance, as through state-owned
hospitals." 61 The Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth circuits have joined the Seventh
"equal access" provision gives rise to rights enforceable under § 1983; however, it based its decision on
stare decisis grounds. See Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 443 F.3d 1005,
1014-16 (8th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot sub nom. Selig v. Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc., 551 U.S.
1142 (2007).
53. Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 509 (8th Cir. 2006); Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152,
1162-63 (9th Cir. 2006).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(A)(8).
55. See Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 324 F.3d 906, 910 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that "medical
assistance" means "financial assistance" and therefore Illinois was under no obligation to provide
intermediate care facilities for the developmentally disabled in the Chicago area) (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 911.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (requiring states to make "medical assistance" available to all eligi-
ble individuals in the same "amount, duration, and scope").
58. See, e.g. Mandy R. ex. rel Mr. & Mrs. R. v. Owens, 464 F.3d 1139, 1144 (10th Cir. 2006);
Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 540 (6th Cir. 2006).
59. 324 F.3d at 910.
60. See Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79, 89-90 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that New Hampshire
residents on waiting list for home and community-based care had a right to reasonably prompt provision
of those services, provided the program was not at capacity); Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 717, 721-22
(11th Cir. 1998) (holding that Florida residents on five-year waiting list for placements in an interme-
diate care facility had a right to services).
61. 324 F.3d at 910. For a discussion of the cases leading up to and following Bruggeman ex. rel.
Bruggeman v. Blagoyevich, see Alison C. Sorkin, Survey, Financial Assistance for Medicaid's Contin-
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Circuit in interpreting "medical assistance" to mean "financial assis-
tance." 62 The Third Circuit, meanwhile, has reserved judgment on the is-
sue.63
One consequence of defining "medical assistance" as "financial assis-
tance" is that states no longer need fear § 1983 liability for lowering pro-
vider reimbursement rates. Traditionally, reimbursement rates were
controlled by the "equal access" provision, but this provision is no longer
enforceable under § 1983.64 In 2007, Oklahoma Medicaid recipients argued
that low reimbursement rates violated the "reasonable promptness" clause
by driving providers out of the Medicaid system, causing long waits for
services. 65 The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument, stating that such an
interpretation would "broaden [the 'reasonable promptness' provision] far
beyond its intended scope." 66 The court further noted that such an interpre-
tation of the "reasonable promptness" provision would require federal
courts to engage in the "onerous task" of evaluating whether a state's Me-
dicaid reimbursement rates were reasonable and adequate. 67 The Tenth
Circuit appears to have overlooked the fact that courts regularly performed
this "onerous" analysis before Gonzaga rendered the "equal access" provi-
sion unenforceable under § 1983.68
A satisfactory definition of "medical assistance" may be illusory. The
Medicaid Act defines "medical assistance" as "payment for all or part of
[enumerated] care and services," 69 seemingly supporting the Seventh Cir-
cuit's view. However, the regulations accompanying the Medicaid Act
seem to require the provision of actual services, 70 undermining the argu-
ment that Medicaid is merely a "payment scheme."71 Additionally, defining
"medical assistance" as "financial assistance" leads to situations in which
ued Existence: The Need for the United States Supreme Court to Adopt the Tenth Circuit's Definition of
Medical Assistance, 85 DENV. U. L. REv. 725 (2008).
62. See Equal Access for El Paso v. Hawkins, 562 F.3d 724, 727-28 (5th Cir. 2009); Okla. Chap-
ter of Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Fogarty, 472 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir. 2007); Mandy R., 464 F.3d at
1143; Westside Mothers, 454 F.3d at 540.
63. See Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 181 n.l (3d Cir. 2004).
64. See supra Part 1-B.
65. See Fogarty, 472 F.3d at 1209.
66. Id. at 1214-15.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Ark. Medical Soc., Inc. v. Reynolds,6 F.3d 519, 530-31 (8th Cir. 1993) (analyzing
whether Arkansas violated the "equal access" provision of Medicaid Act when it reduced provider
payments by 20 percent).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (2006).
70. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. §§ 440-441 (2010) ("A state plan must specify that, at a minimum, cate-
gorically needy individuals are furmished with . .. Pregnancy-related services and services for other
conditions that might complicate the pregnancy.").
71. See Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 324 F.3d 906, 910(7th Cir. 2003).
2011] 933
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
the "reasonable promptness" and "comparability" provisions are meaning-
less, such as when reimbursement rates are so low that no providers will
participate in the Medicaid program. 72 To avoid this result, the "equal
access" provision of the Medicaid Act, requiring that states provide reim-
bursement rates sufficient to enlist providers, must be enforced. The next
section will discuss how plaintiffs are using the Supremacy Clause to en-
force the "equal access" provision and other Medicaid provisions not en-
forceable under § 1983.
II. MEDICAID ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE SUPREMACY
CLAUSE
The Supreme Court in Gonzaga University v. Doe significantly li-
mited the availability of § 1983 as a cause of action for plaintiffs alleging
violations of federal laws.73 However, the Court has placed no similar re-
strictions on court access under the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution, which declares federal law supreme over state law. 74 Argua-
bly, the same policy reasons for limiting the availability of § 1983 as a
cause of action would counsel against allowing plaintiffs to sue under the
Supremacy Clause, since both types of lawsuit flood courts with litigation
to enforce federal laws. However, courts have been careful to avoid con-
flating § 1983 and the Supremacy Clause, observing that the Supremacy
Clause deals with the federal structure of the government while § 1983
deals with individual federal rights.75 Consequently, advocates and scholars
are paying attention to preemption as an alternative means of enforcing
safety net statutes such as the Medicaid Act.76
72. See Kenneth R. Wiggins, Note, Medicaid and the Enforceable Right to Receive Medical
Assistance: The Need for a Definition of "Medical Assistance" 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1487, 1509
(2006) (noting that "medical assistance" "would have to be given a definition that includes 'the provi-
sion of services' for the "comparability" provision "to have any effect in certain cases").
73. 536 U.S. 273, 290-91 (2002) (holding that the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of
1974 does not give rise to personal rights enforceable under § 1983).
74. U.S. CONST. art. VI; see PhRMA v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 666-68 (2003) (holding that
Maine's prescription drug program was not preempted by federal Medicaid law); Verizon Md., Inc., v.
Pub. Svc. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 642-43 (2002) (holding that corporate plaintiffs claim that
state commission order was preempted by federal telecommunications law was sufficient to confer
subject matter jurisdiction); see also Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal. v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 1050, 1063 (9th
Cir. 2008) ("Indeed, even as the Supreme Court has tightened the requirements for seeking damages
under § 1983, it has consistently reaffirmed the availability of injunctive relief to prevent state officials
from implementing state legislation allegedly preempted by federal law.").
75. See Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 509 (8th Cir. 2006) ("Preemption concerns the
federal structure of the Nation rather than the securing of rights, privileges and immunities to individu-
als." (quoting Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 117 (1989)).
76. See, e.g., Bobroff, supra note 21.
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This section will first provide an overview of the preemption doctrine.
It will then discuss the Supreme Court's 2003 decision in PhRMA v. Walsh,
which affirmed the continued viability of preemption as a means for plain-
tiffs to enforce the Medicaid Act.77 It concludes by examining Lankford v.
Sherman and Independent Living Center v. Shewry, two recent circuit court
decisions that upheld the enforceability of Medicaid's "reasonable stan-
dards" and "equal access" provisions under the Supremacy Clause, even
though neither provision is enforceable under § 1983.78
A. The Preemption Doctrine: An Overview
The Supremacy Clause provides that the "Constitution, and the Laws
of the United States . .. shall be the supreme Law of the Land; .. . any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwith-
standing."79 The Supremacy Clause "is not the source of any federal
rights"; rather, "it [s]ecures federal rights by giving them priority when
they come into conflict with state law."80 The Supreme Court in Verizon
Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Commission recently affirmed the prin-
ciple that a plaintiff need not establish a private cause of action before
suing to enjoin a state official from enforcing a law that conflicts with fed-
eral law. 81 The Court explained that when a plaintiff challenges a state law
on the grounds that it conflicts with federal law, the result is a federal ques-
tion giving rise to federal jurisdiction.82 The Court has not interpreted the
Supremacy Clause as conferring an implied cause of action, but several
lower courts and one eminent constitutional scholar have suggested that
this is, effectively, what the Supremacy Clause does.83
Preemption comes in three varieties: express, field, and conflict. 84 Ex-
press preemption occurs when Congress inserts a preemption clause in the
77. 538 U.S. 664, 666-68 (2003).
78. See Shewry, 543 F.3d at 1063; Lankford, 451 F.3d at 509-11.
79. U.S. CONST. art.VI.
80. See Golden State Transit Corp., 493 U.S. at 107 (alteration in original)(internal quotation
marks omitted).
81. See 535 U.S. 635, 642-43 (2002).
82. Id; see also Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 n.14 (1983).
83. See Planned Parenthood of Hous. and South Tex. v. Sanchez, 403 F.3d 324, 334 n.47 (5th Cir.
2005) (collecting cases); see also13 D. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER EDWARD H.
COOPER, & RICHARD D. FREER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED
MATTERS3D§ 3566, at 291-92(3d ed. 2008).
84. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230-31 (1947) (delineating several types
of preemption); see also Chang Derek Liu, Note, The Blank Page Before You: Should the Preemption
Doctrine Apply to Unwritten Practices?, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 350, 356-58 (2009) (explaining the
preemption typology).
2011] 935
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
federal legislation itself, an example of which is the ERISA preemption
clause. 85 Field preemption occurs when Congress enacts a scheme of feder-
al regulation "so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Con-
gress left no room for the States to supplement it."86 Finally, conflict
preemption occurs when a federal statute and a state statute are irreconcila-
ble, either because the statues command different things ("impossibility"
preemption) or because the state statute poses an obstacle to the accom-
plishment of the goals of the federal statute ("obstacle" preemption). 87 The
Medicaid Act does not contain an express preemption clause, nor does the
cooperative federal-state structure of the Medicaid Act suggest that Con-
gress intended for it to exclusively occupy the field of public health care
regulation. Impossibility preemption is rare, as states generally do not enact
laws that directly contradict the Medicaid Act. Thus, obstacle preemption is
the variety of preemption most often implicated in the Medicaid context.
The starting point for any preemption analysis is congressional in-
tent.88 Courts must first determine the scope and purpose of the federal
legislation and then decide whether the federal law displaces the state
law. 89 Where Congress has legislated in an area traditionally regulated by
the states, there is a presumption against preemption. 90 This presumption is
particularly strong where the federal and state statutes appear to pursue
"common purposes." 91 To overcome the presumption against preemption,
Congress's intent to preempt state law must be "clear and manifest."92
Both § 1983 and the Supremacy Clause are subject to the Eleventh
Amendment, which bars private citizens from suing states in federal
court.93 In Ex Parte Young, the Supreme Court announced an exception to
this rule, holding that state officials whose actions allegedly conflict with
the U.S. Constitution may be subject to suit in federal court. 94 The Court
reasoned that state officials whose actions are preempted by the Constitu-
tion are stripped of their authority and, thus, are subject to suit as individu-
als.95 The Court later expanded this principle to include suits where a state
85. See 29 U.S.C. § I144(a) (2006).
86. See Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
87. See Liu, supra note 84, at 357-58.
88. Retail Clerks Intern. Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963).
89. See Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO.L.J. 2085, 2092 (2000).
90. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
91. PhRMA v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 664, 666 (2003) (quoting N.Y. State Dep't of Soc. Servs.v. Dub-
lino, 413 U.S. 405, 421 (1973)).
92. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230..
93. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999).
94. 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
95. Id
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official's actions allegedly conflict with federal law, not just the Constitu-
tion.96 The Court has declined to expand the relief available under the Su-
premacy Clause to include monetary damages, reasoning that when a
plaintiff sues to recover money from the state, the state-and not the named
official-is actually the actual party in interest. 97 The same rationale bars
§ 1983 plaintiffs from recovering monetary damages from state officials in
their official capacities, although § 1983 plaintiffs may recover damages
from state officials in their personal capacities. 98
The Supreme Court in PhRMA v. Walsh recently affirmed the use of
obstacle preemption to enforce the Medicaid Act. 99Walsh involved a suit
by drug manufacturers to enjoin the implementation of the Maine Rx Pro-
gram, which was designed to lower prescription drug costs for Maine resi-
dents.' 00 To compel drug manufacturers to participate in the program,
Maine imposed onerous pre-authorization requirements through its Medica-
id program on drugs made by non-participating manufacturers. 0 ' The Su-
preme Court held six-to-three that the Maine Rx Program was not
preempted by the Medicaid Act. 102 The Court reasoned that the "mere fact
that prior authorization may impose a modest impediment to access to pre-
scription drugs provided at government expense does not provide a suffi-
cient basis for pre-emption of the Maine Rx Program." 03
Justices Scalia and Thomas filed concurring opinions challenging the
use of obstacle preemption to enforce the Medicaid Act. 104 Scalia argued
that the appropriate remedy for violations of the Medicaid Act is the termi-
nation of federal funds by the Secretary of Health and Human
es.105Thomas, meanwhile, faulted the majority and dissent for attempting to
distill a single purpose from the Medicaid Act, noting that "[t]he Medicaid
Act represents a delicate balance Congress struck between competing inter-
ests-care and cost, mandates and flexibility, oversight and discretion."' 0 6
Additionally, Thomas likened Spending Clause statutes to a contract be-
96. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 n. 14 (1983).
97. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury,
323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945)).
98. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991).
99. See PhRMA v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 664, 662-68 (2003).
100. Id. at 656.
101. Id. at 654.
102. Id. at 668.
103. Id. at 667.
104. Id. at 675 (Scalia, J., concurring); Id. at 681-83 (Thomas, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 675 (Scalia, J., concurring).
106. See Walsh, 538 U.S. at 676 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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tween the federal government and the states.107 He argued that third party
beneficiaries should be required to "demonstrate an 'unambiguously con-
ferred right"' to sue under the Supremacy Clause. 08
These arguments are troubling for a number of reasons. First, although
the Medicaid Act gives the Secretary of Health and Human Services the
right to terminate federal funds for noncompliance, this punishment is rare-
ly invoked, and understandably so. 109 Withholding funds is a drastic and
politically unpopular remedy that hurts both Medicaid recipients and
states.110 Second, Justice Thomas's suggestion that plaintiffs be required to
demonstrate that an "unambiguously conferred right" to enforce Spending
Clause statutes under the Supremacy Clause has no support in the text of
the Constitution. 1 1 The text of the Supremacy Clause does not distinguish
between Spending Clause statutes and other federal statutes.112 Moreover,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that the Supremacy Clause is not
premised on individual rights. 113 Rather, it is best understood as a choice of
law rule that gives federal law priority over conflicting state laws.114Ana-
logizing the Medicaid Act to a contract enforceable only by the federal
government and the states serves no constitutional purpose and functions
only to disenfranchise low-income individuals.115
107. Id. at 682-83; see also Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 349-350 (1997) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (noting that federal-state spending agreements are "in the nature of a contract" and likening
§ 1983 plaintiffs to third-party beneficiaries)
108. Id (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002)).
109. See Sasha Samberg-Champion, Note, How to Read Gonzaga: Laying the Seeds of a Coherent
Section 1983 Jurisprudence, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1838, 1859 (2003) ( "[I]n the thirty years between
FERPA's adoption and Gonzaga, the Department of Education did not once withhold or terminate
funding for a violation of the Act.").
110. See Lisa E. Key, Private Enforcement of Federal Funding Conditions Under §1983: The
Supreme Court's Failure to Adhere to the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
283, 292-93 (1996) (offering reasons why the Secretary of Health and Human Services is reluctant to
terminate federal funding for Spending Clause programs).
111. See Bobroff, supra note 21, at 77.
112. Id; see U.S. CONST. art. VI..
113. See Verizon Md., Inc., v. Pub. Svc. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 642-43 (2002); Golden
State Transit Corp. v. City of L.A., 493 U.S. 103, 107-08 (1989).
114. See Dinh, supra note 89, at 2088; see also Golden State, 493 U.S. at 107 (The Supremacy
Clause "is not the source of any federal rights; it secure[s] federal rights by according them priority
whenever they come in conflict with state law."(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)).
115. See Bobroff, supra note 21, at 78("The extension of the contract metaphor to defeat preemp-
tion claims under Spending Clause statutes is more of a political than a constitutional doctrine, having
the effect of barring court access for low-income and disadvantaged individuals.").
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B. Preemption in the Circuits
In two recent appeals, Medicaid plaintiffs succeeded in using the Su-
premacy Clause to enforce provisions that are no longer enforceable
through § 1983. The first case, Lankford v. Sherman, involved a suit by
Medicaid beneficiaries to enforce Medicaid's "reasonable standards" provi-
sion, which requires that states set reasonable standards for determining
eligibility and the extent of medical assistance. 116 The second case, Inde-
pendent Living Center v. Shewry, involved a suit by pharmacies, health
care providers, and Medicaid beneficiaries to enforce Medicaid's "equal
access" provision, which mandates that states set adequate reimbursement
rates. 117
1. Lankford v. Sherman
The plaintiffs in Lankford v. Sherman were adult Medicaid recipients
who sued the director of the Missouri Medicaid program to enjoin the im-
plementation of an emergency regulation reducing coverage of durable
medical equipment for all Medicaid recipients except those who were
blind, pregnant, needy children, and those who receive home health care. 118
The plaintiffs brought suit under § 1983 claiming that the Missouri regula-
tion violated Medicaid's "comparability" and "reasonable standards" provi-
sions because it gave preferential treatment to Medicaid recipients who
were blind. 119The plaintiffs also alleged that the list of durable medical
equipment contained in the regulation was so limited that it failed to
achieve Medicaid's objectives and, therefore, was preempted by the regula-
tions implementing Medicaid's "reasonable standards" provision.120
The Eighth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' § 1983 arguments on the
grounds that Missouri relied exclusively on state funds to provide addition-
al durable medical equipment to residents who were blind and because
Medicaid's "reasonable standards" provision was not enforceable under
§ 1983.121 However, the court held that plaintiffs showed a probability of
success on their Supremacy Clause claim. 122 The court noted that
116. 451 F.3d 496, 500 (8th Cir. 2006); see 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17).
117. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal. v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2008); see
§ I396a(a)(30)(A).
118. Lankford, 451 F.3d at 501-02.
119. Id. at 502, 505-06; see 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10), (a)(17).
120. Lankford, 451 F.3d at 510; see also 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b) ("Each service must be sufficient
in amount, duration, and scope to reasonably achieve its purpose.").
121. Lankford, 451 F.3d at 506-09.
122. Id. at 513.
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"[p]reemption claims are analyzed under a different test than section 1983
claims, affording plaintiffs an alternative theory for relief when a state law
conflicts with a federal statute or regulation."l 23 The court commented that
when a state receives federal matching funds under the Medicaid Act, it is
bound to comply with all of Medicaid's statutory and regulatory require-
ments, including the "reasonable standards" provision.124 The court rea-
soned that while the Medicaid Act did not oblige Missouri to provide
durable medical equipment, once the state elected to do so, it could not
"arbitrarily choose which ... items to reimburse under its Medicaid poli-
cy."1 25 On remand, the district court granted a preliminary injunction. 126
The Eighth Circuit's decision in Lankford v. Sherman is significant in
a number of respects. First, it signals that the circuits have limited the hold-
ing of Gonzaga to § 1983 claims and have declined Justice Thomas's invi-
tation in Walsh to extend it to all individual claims to enforce federal
statutes.127 Second, the Eighth Circuit equates the "purpose" of the Medica-
id Act with the fulfillment of its statutory and regulatory requirements.1 28
This approach acknowledges that Medicaid is a complex regulatory scheme
with multiple objectives and refrains from attempting to "distill from it a
single purpose" -a criticism Justice Thomas made of the Walsh majority
and dissenting opinions. 129Lankford demonstrates that plaintiffs seeking to
use obstacle preemption to enforce the Medicaid statute are wise to portray
it as the sum of its many, varied parts.
Lankford also demonstrates the limits of using the "reasonable stan-
dards" provision to enforce the Medicaid Act. Because most of the services
in the Medicaid program are optional, states may amend their state plans to
eliminate programs or reduce benefits without violating the Medicaid
Act. 130 Indeed, the emergency regulation at issue in Lankford was an at-
123. Id. at 509.
124. Id. at 510.
125. Id.at ll.
126. Lankford v. Sherman, No. 05-4285-CV-C-DW, 2007 WL 689749 at *4 (W.D. Mo. March 2,
2007).
127. See Lankford, 451 F.3d at 509;PhRMA v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 664, 683 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("Under this Court's precedents, private parties may employ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or an im-
plied private right of action only if they demonstrate an 'unambiguously conferred right."" (quoting
Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002)).)
128. Lankford,451 F.3d at 511 ("While a state has discretion to determine the optional services in
its Medicaid plan, a state's failure to provide Medicaid coverage for non-experimental, medically-
necessary services within a covered Medicaid category is both per se unreasonable and inconsistent
with the stated goals of Medicaid.").
129. See 538 U.S. at 676 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The text of this complex statute belies...
efforts to distill a single purpose.").
130. See, e.g., Lankford, 451 F.3d at 511 ("While a state has discretion to determine the optional
services in its Medicaid plan, a state's failure to provide Medicaid coverage for non-experimental,
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tempt by the Missouri legislature to soften the blow of the complete elimi-
nation of durable medical equipment program for most Medicaid reci-
pients.131 If plaintiffs challenge partial cutbacks of an optional service, the
state may simply opt to cut the service entirely. For this reason, the "rea-
sonable standards" provision is most useful for challenging attempts by the
states to reduce or eliminate mandatory Medicaid services. 132
2. Independent Living Center v. Shewry
In February 2008, the California legislature passed a law reducing by
ten percent its payments to medical providers participating in the state's
Medi-Cal program.133 Pharmacies, health care providers, Medi-Cal reci-
pients and a senior citizens' group brought suit in Independent Living Cen-
ter v. Shewry to enjoin the implementation of the new law on the grounds
that it was preempted by Medicaid's "equal access" provision.134 Medi-Cal
reimbursement rates were already so low, the plaintiffs argued, that many
providers refused to participate in the Medi-Cal program.135 The plaintiffs
feared that further reductions would drive more quality physicians, special-
ists, dentists and pharmacies out of the program.136
The district court denied the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary in-
junction, basing its conclusion on precedent denying § 1983 relief.137 The
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, ruling that plaintiffs need not estab-
lish a federal right under § 1983 to bring a Supremacy Clause claim. 138 The
court observed that for more than a century, federal courts have entertained
suits to enjoin state officials from implementing laws allegedly preempted
by federal law, regardless of whether the federal statute in question gives
rise to a federal right.139 On remand, the district court granted the plaintiffs'
request for a preliminary injunction.140
medically-necessary services within a covered Medicaid category is both per se unreasonable and
inconsistent with the stated goals of Medicaid." (emphasis added)).
131. See id. at 501.
132. For a list of mandatory coverage groups and services, see MEDICAID: A PRIMER, supra note
28, at 5, 10.
133. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal. v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2008).
134. Id. at 1052-53.
135. Id. at 1053 (noting that forty-five percent of primary care providers, fifty percent of special-
ists, and ninety percent of dentists in California already refused to participate in the Medi-Cal system).
136. Id.
137. Id at 1054.
138. Id. at 1061-62.
139. Id.
140. See Indep. Living Ctr.of S. Cal. v. Shewry, No. CV 08-3315, 2008 WL 3891211 at *11 (C.D.
Cal. Aug. 18, 2008).
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Independent Living Center is a significant victory for Medicaid plain-
tiffs because it signals the continued enforceability of Medicaid's "equal
access" provision. With a growing number of circuits interpreting "medical
assistance" to mean only "financial assistance" under the Medicaid Act, 141
the "equal access" provision has arguably become the most important pro-
vision in the Medicaid Act. Whereas other Medicaid provisions regulate the
manner in which a state provides services (for instance, by requiring that
medical assistance be furnished promptly or that the standards implement-
ing programs be reasonable), the "equal access" provision actually regu-
lates the amount of services available in a given Medicaid program by
requiring states to pay providers competitive rates.Thus, rigorous enforce-
ment of the "equal access" provision is key if the other provisions of the
Medicaid Act are to have any effect.
Unlike the Eighth Circuit in Lankford, the Ninth Circuit in Indepen-
dent Living Center did not reach the merits of the plaintiffs' claim.142 Thus,
Independent Living Center offers no guidance as to the standard for deter-
mining a violation of Medicaid's "equal access" provision under the Su-
premacy Clause. On remand, the district court applied the Ninth Circuit's
test for determining a violation of the "equal access" provision under
§ 1983.143 This standard requires the state to demonstrate that it relied on
responsible cost studies, not budgetary concerns, when setting reimburse-
ment rates. 144 The Eighth Circuit has also interpreted the "equal access"
provision to require reliance on cost studies.145 However, the Third and
Seventh Circuits have rejected this view, instead adopting result-oriented
tests for the adequacy of reimbursement rates.146 As more plaintiffs seek to
enforce the "equal access" provision under the Supremacy Clause, the cir-
cuits will have to decide whether to import their tests for § 1983 enforce-
ment of the "equal access" provision or whether to develop a new, more
uniform test.
141. See, e.g., Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 324 F.3d 906, 910 (7th Cir. 2003).
142. See Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal, 543 F.3d at 1066. But cf Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496,
513 (8th Cir. 2006).
143. See Indep. Living Ctr., 2008 WL 3891211 at *3-4.
144. Id; (citing Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491, 1496 (9th Cir. 1997)); see also Alaska
Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 424 F.3d 931, 940-41 (9th Cir.
2005) (applying same interpretation of the "equal access" provision outside the § 1983 setting).
145. See Ark. Med. Soc'y v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 530 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that state conducted
no studies on effects reimbursement rate reductions would have on access to care and instead based its
decision to lower rates purely on budgetary concerns).
146. See Methodist Hosps. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1030 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that "equal
access" provision does not require a state to consider any particular factors, but rather, requires that the
state arrive at substantive results consistent with the Medicaid Act); see also Rite Aid of Pa., Inc. v.
Houstoun, 171 F.3d 842, 851 (3d Cir. 1999) (same).
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Independent Living Center is unique in that it involved preemption of
a state law explicitly lowering Medicaid reimbursement rates by a certain
percent across the board. More often, plaintiffs challenging the adequacy of
reimbursement rates will not have such a law on which to rely. More likely,
they will have to seek to enjoin the state budget provision implementing the
reductions.147 This approach is unpopular with the courts, particularly in
the present economic climate, as it requires states to engage in the painstak-
ing process of reallocating their budgets.148 Alternatively, plaintiffs can
challenge a state's methods of setting reimbursement rates; however, this
approach also runs into problems. First, it is not clear that a state's methods
for setting reimbursement rates are "laws" within the meaning of the Su-
premacy Clause. 149 Second, states must first obtain approval of their me-
thods of setting reimbursement rates from CMS before they can take
effect.150 Thus, these methods are entitled to deference.'51 A third option is
to treat reimbursement rates themselves as "laws" within the meaning of
the Supremacy Clause and argue that the inadequacy of the reimbursement
rates poses an obstacle to the accomplishment of the goals of the Medicaid
Act. This approach, while untested, would enable plaintiffs to seek an in-
junction requiring states to raise reimbursement rates in the future, rather
than forcing plaintiffs to react to state budgets once cuts have been adopted
by the legislature. The next section will discuss Supreme Court precedent
that supports treating reimbursement rates as "laws" for the purposes of the
Supremacy Clause.
147. See, e.g., Conn. Ass'n of Health Care Facilities v. Rell, No. 3:10CVl36, 2010 WL 2232693, at
*3 (D. Conn. June 3, 2010).
148. See id. at 10 ("The Court recognizes that enjoining section 32 would require not just a change
to Medicaid rates but a re-allocation of the entire Connecticut state budget. Under deferential standard,
an in light of these economic circumstances, the Court does not find that Plaintiff has shown a likelih-
ood of success on the merits.").
149. See Equal Access for El Paso v. Hawkins, 562 F.3d 724, 730 (5th Cir. 2009) (rejecting plain-
tiffs' argument that state methods of setting reimbursement rates are "laws" within the meaning of the
Supremacy Clause). But see Wash. State Pharmacy Ass'n v. Gregoire, No. C09 5174-BHS, 2009 WL
1259632 at *1 (W.D. Wash. March 31, 2009) (enjoining informal rule reducing reimbursement rates for
brand-name prescription drugs by six percent on the grounds that the rate cut was preempted by the
Medicaid Act and that state had failed to give notice and seek comments before implementing the cut).
150. See 42 C.F.R. § 447.201 (2010).
151. See Conn. Ass'n of Health Care Facilities, 2010 WL 2232693 at *10-11 (D. Conn.. June 3,
2010)(according deference to the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Service's determination that a
Connecticut law freezing reimbursement rates complied with the Medicaid Act); see generally Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (holding that a federal agency's interpretation
of ambiguous statutory language is entitled to deference).
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III. THE LIMITS OF PREEMPTION
The willingness of the circuits to enforce Medicaid provisions under
the Supremacy Clause has generated excitement about the potential use of
preemption as an alternative to § 1983 for enforcing the Medicaid Act. 152
However, it is important to keep in mind the limits of the Supremacy
Clause. Unlike § 1983, which applies to a broad range of state actions, the
Supremacy Clause applies only to state "laws." This distinction is critical
in the Medicaid context, where informal state rules often have the force and
effect of law.153 Fortunately, the Supreme Court has given the Supremacy
Clause a broad scope.154 This section will discuss the variety of state ac-
tions that the Court has held are preempted by federal statutes. It will then
offer legal and policy arguments for why the Medicaid Act should preempt
informal state rules, particularly inadequate reimbursement rates.
A. The Outer Limits of the Preemption Doctrine
The Supreme Court has given the preemption doctrine a broad scope.
On the federal side, the Court has given preemptive power to federal regu-
lations,155 presidential executive orders, 156 and federal common law.157 On
the state side, the Court has applied preemption to state regulations,158 ad-
judicative orders,1 59 interpretive guidelines,160 municipal ordinances, 161
and common law causes of action.1621n Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public
Service Commission, the Court held that the federal courts had jurisdiction
to hear a claim involving an adjudicative order that was allegedly
preempted by federal law. 163 Without commenting on the non-legislative
152. See generally Bobroff, supra note 21.
153. See, e.g., Biekert v. Maram, 905 N.E.2d 357, 367-68 (Ill. App. 2009) (illustrating the potential
of a state screening manual to preclude Medicaid-eligible individuals from receiving services).
154. See, e.g., Verizon Md., Inc., v. Pub. Svc. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 642-43 (2002)
(applying preemption to a state adjudicatory order); U.S. v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 116 (2000) (applying
preemption to state regulations); Geier v. Am.Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 874 (2000) (applying
preemption to a common law cause of action); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 391
(1992) (applying preemption to interpretive guidelines); Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med.
Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 722 (1985) (applying preemption to a municipal ordinance).
155. E.g., Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982).
156. Eg., Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264,
273 (1974).
157. Eg., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988).
158. See, e.g., Locke, 529 U.S. at 116.
159. Verizon Md., Inc., 535 U.S. at 642-43.
160. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 391 (1992).
161. Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 722 (1985).
162. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 874 (2000).
163. 535 U.S. at 648.
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character of the administrative order, the Court held that the complaint
alleged an "ongoing violation of federal law" and therefore the plaintiffs
had stated a claim under Ex Parte Young." Similarly, in Morales v. Trans
World Airlines, the Court enjoined states attorneys general from enforcing
a set of guidelines interpreting state consumer fraud laws against air-
lines. 165 Although the guidelines did "not purport to 'create any new laws
or regulations,"' the Court held that they were expressly preempted by
federal aviation law. 166 These cases demonstrate that the Court construes
the Supremacy Clause broadly where administrative actions conflict with
federal statutes.
The Supreme Court has yet to hold that federal law preempts unwrit-
ten state policies or practices.167 On the one hand, this limitation makes
sense because it protects states from overbearing judicial interference.1 68
However, as Professor David Sloss has noted, it also gives states a perverse
incentive to de-codify laws.169 Moreover, limiting the Supremacy Clause in
this way is hard to justify in light of the fact that, for more than a century,
the Supreme Court has upheld injunctions against state officials whose
actions conflicted with the Constitution. 170 Some scholars have proposed
that federal statutes should preempt unwritten state policies and practices
that rise to the level of "legal rules" or "customs." 71 More and more Medi-
caid plaintiffs will likely test this theory now that Gonzaga has limited the
availability of § 1983 as a cause of action.
B. Applying the Preemption Doctrine to Medicaid Reimbursement Rates
The Supreme Court has made clear that the scope of the preemption
doctrine extends beyond state laws to encompass a broad variety of infor-
mal state rules. This broad applicability is particularly important in the
Medicaid context, where informal state rules are equally capable of reduc-
164. Id at 645.
165. 504 U.S. 374, 390 (1992).
166. Id at 379, 391.
167. See Liu, supra note 84, at 351; David Sloss, Constitutional Remedies for Statutory Violations,
89 IOWA L. REv. 355, 383 (2004) (noting that Supreme Court has never explicitly applied federal
preemption to "state executive (as opposed to administrative) action that allegedly violates a federal
statute").
168. See Liu, supra note 84, at 377-81.
169. See Sloss, supra note 167, at 359.
170. See, e.g., Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R.R. Co., 244 U.S. 499, 507 (1917) (holding that
the Court had jurisdiction under Ex Parte Young to hear claim that the actions of state tax assessors
were allegedly preempted by the Fourteenth Amendment); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154
U.S. 362, 390-91 (1894).
171. See Liu, supra note 84, at 386; Sloss, supra note 167, at 431.
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ing or eliminating services as state laws and regulations. A recent Illinois
appellate decision provides an illuminating example. The plaintiff in Bi-
ekert v. Maram was an adult with cerebral palsy who applied for in-home
services but was denied because he did not meet the eligibility criteria con-
tained in a pre-admission screening manual.172 Notably, the manual re-
quired applicants to have a cognitive impairment to qualify, in direct con-
contravention of federal and state regulations.173 Without invoking
"preemption," the court held that the manual impermissibly defined eligi-
bility more narrowly than state or federal law.' 74
One promising application of preemption in the Medicaid context is in
the area of reimbursement rates. Reimbursement rates influence the wil-
lingness of providers to participate in state Medicaid programs and thus
impact the ability of Medicaid patients to obtain care.175 Medicaid's "equal
access" provision requires states to set reimbursement rates sufficient to
enlist providers in the Medicaid program.176 Whether reimbursement rates
are "laws" within the meaning of the Supremacy Clause, however, is an
open question. State agencies typically "calculate[] reimbursement rates by
reference to a formula rather than a fixed amount."' 77 States must describe
the policy and methods for setting reimbursement rates in their state plans
and must submit a state plan amendment every time they materially change
their rates. 178 The rates themselves are published as an annual fee schedule
in state Medicaid manuals and on state websites. 179 Like the attorney gen-
eral guidelines the Supreme Court held were preempted in Morales v.
Trans WorldAirlines, reimbursement rates are promulgated by state agen-
cies, are codified in manuals, and have the potential to burden the operation
of a federal law. Thus, they should be treated as laws and subject to
preemption under Medicaid's "equal access" provision.
Few plaintiffs have chosen to argue that reimbursement rates them-
selves are preempted, instead opting to tether their complaints to state laws
that have the effect of lowering reimbursement rates. In Independent Living
172. Biekert v. Maram, 905 N.E.2d 357, 359-62 (111. App. 2009).
173. Id. at 368.
174. Id
175. For a discussion of the relationship of reimbursement rates to provider participation, see Equal
Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins, 428 F.Supp.2d 585, 601-02 (W.D. Tex. 2006) (collecting cases),
rev'd and remanded,509 F.3d 697 (5th Cir. 2007).
176. 29 U.S.C. § 1396a(30)(A).
177. Minn. Pharmacists Ass'n v. Pawlenty, 690 F.Supp.2d 809, 827 (D. Minn. 2010)..
178. 42 C.F.R. §§ 430.12(c), 447.201.
179. For an example of Medicaid reimbursement rates, see Medicaid Reimbursement, ILLINOIS
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTHCARE AND FAMILY SERVICE, http://www.hfs.illinois.gov/reimbursement/ (last
visited Feb. 28, 2011).
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Center v. Shewry, the plaintiffs were fortunate to have a law dealing exclu-
sively with reimbursement rates to which they could cite.18 0 More often,
plaintiffs will not have such a law upon which to rely. Instead, they have
cited to state budgets implementing Medicaid cuts or challenged state's
methods of setting reimbursement rates.s18 Both approaches present poten-
tial problems, as a recent Fifth Circuit case demonstrates.
In Equal Access of El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins, Medicaid recipients and
providers brought suit against Texas's Medicaid agency, alleging that in-
adequate reimbursement rates were driving providers out of El Paso, Texas,
an area with a high percentage of Medicaid recipients. 182 The plaintiffs
brought suit under the Supremacy Clause, § 1983, and the Equal Protection
Clause to enforce a variety of Medicaid provisions, including the "reasona-
ble promptness" and "equal access" provisions. 183 The plaintiffs argued
that the Medicaid Act preempted the Texas legislature's proposed budget
as well as the Texas Medicaid agency's "regulations, policies, practices and
procedures for administering Medicaid services in El Paso County." 84 The
district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim that the Texas state budget was
preempted, holding that they had failed to identify a portion of the budget
"which, if nullified, would redress their alleged injuries." 85 Furthermore,
the court held that it was "purely speculative whether the legislature would
appropriate more money in the future as a result of the nullification of some
unspecified portion of [the proposed budget]."' 86
The district court certified the case for interlocutory appeal to the Fifth
Circuit to decide whether Medicaid's "equal access" provision is enforcea-
ble under § 1983.187 The court held that the provision was not enforceable
and ordered the dismissal of all of the plaintiffs' claims with prejudice.188
The plaintiffs appealed only the court's dismissal of their claims to enforce
180. 543 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2008).
181. See, e.g., Conn. Ass'n of Health Care Facilities v. Rell, No. 3:10CV136, 2010 WL 2232693 at
*3 (D. Conn. June 3, 2010) (challenging provision of state budget freezing reimbursement rates for
nursing facilities); Wash. State Pharmacy Ass'n v. Gregoire, No. C09 5174-BHS, 2009 WL 1259632 at
*1 (W.D. Wash. March 31, 2009) (challenging informal state rule reducing reimbursement rates for
brand-name prescription drugs by six percent); Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins, 428
F.Supp.2d 585, 607 (W.D. Tex. 2006) (challenging state budget and state methods for setting reim-
bursement rates), rev d and remanded, 509 F.3d 697 (5th Cir. 2007).
182. Equal Access for El Paso, Inc., 428 F.Supp.2d at 594-95.
183. Id at 595-96.
184. Id. at 607.
185. Id. at 607.
186. Id. at 608.
187. Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins, 509 F.3d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 2007).
188. Id. at 704.
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Medicaid's "reasonable promptness" provision. 189 With regard to the plain-
tiffs' claim that the "reasonable promptness" provision preempted the Tex-
as Medicaid agency's administration of reimbursement rates in El Paso,
Texas, the court held that the plaintiffs had "failed to identify any state law
or regulation with which the Reasonable Promptness Provision conflicts
and therefore preempts."' 90
The outcome in Equal Access might have been different had the plain-
tiffs' appealed the dismissal of their preemption claim under Medicaid's
"equal access" provision. The "reasonable promptness" provision, unlike
the "equal access" provision, does not directly reference provider reim-
bursement rates. 191 The circuits have dismissed similar claims using the
"reasonable promptness" provision to challenge inadequate reimbursement
rates under § 1983.192 Secondly, the plaintiffs should have pled their Su-
premacy Clause claims with greater specificity. For instance, they could
have identified the specific lines in the Texas budget that related to the
Medicaid budget.193 Other courts have allowed suits to proceed where
plaintiffs challenged portions of a state budget on preemption grounds.194
Similarly, instead of relying vaguely on the Texas Medicaid agency's "reg-
ulations, policies, practices and procedures" for administering the Medicaid
program, the plaintiffs could have argued that the Medicaid Act preempted
the policy and methods for setting reimbursement rates described in the
state plan.195 However, CMS would have approved these methods when the
state submitted its state plan and, therefore, the methods would be entitled
to deference.196
Had the plaintiffs argued that the fee schedule contained in the state
Medicaid manual was preempted, they could have avoided many of these
problems. CMS does not approve Medicaid rates themselves, only the me-
189. Equal Access of El Paso v. Hawkins, 562 F.3d 724, 726 (5th Cir. 2009).
190. Id. at 730.
191. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(8) ("A state plan for medical assistance must. . . provide that all
individuals wishing to make application for medical assistance under the plan shall have opportunity to
do so, and that such assistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individu-
als.").
192. See e.g., Okla. Chapter of Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Fogarty, 472 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2007).
193. The plaintiffs' complaint referenced lines B.2. I. through B.2.8. of the "Medicaid Budget";
however, apparently they were referencing the "Legislative Budget Board Recommendations" and not
the budget itself, as the district court noted. Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins, 428 F.Supp.2d
585, 607 n.24 (W.D. Tex. 2006).
194. See Conn. Ass'n of Health Care Facilities v. Rell, No. 3:10CV136, 2010 WL 2232693 at *10
(D. Conn. June 3, 2010).
195. See 42 C.F.R. § 447.201.
196. Conn. Ass'n of Health Care Facilities, 2010 WL 2232693 at *10-11; Minn. Pharmacists
Ass'n v. Pawlenty, 690 F.Supp.2d 809, 825-28 (D. Minn. 2010).
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thods for setting rates, therefore arguably the fee schedule would not be
entitled to deference. Moreover, because a fee schedule embodies both the
state's formula for setting reimbursement rates and the money available in
the state Medicaid budget, the plaintiffs would not have needed to establish
standing to challenge both the Texas state budget and the Texas Medicaid
agency's methods of implementing the Texas Medicaid program. That the
rates themselves posed an obstacle to the fulfillment of the "equal access"
provision should have been sufficient.
CONCLUSION
Recent developments in the circuits suggest that the preemption doc-
trine is a viable alternative to § 1983 in suits to enforce the Medicaid Act.
The Eighth Circuit's opinion in Lankford v. Sherman and the Ninth Cir-
cuit's opinion in Independent Living Center v. Walsh demonstrate that the
circuits have distinguished § 1983 enforcement of the Medicaid Act from
its enforceability under the Supremacy Clause. 197 Although Justices Tho-
mas and Scalia objected to the use of the Supremacy Clause to enforce the
Medicaid Act in PhRMA v. Walsh, they joined three years later in a un-
animous opinion holding an Arkansas law preempted by the Medicaid
Act.198 Thus, while Medicaid plaintiffs should be alert for attempts to limit
the availability of the preemption doctrine in suits to enforce the Medicaid
Act, this threat has not materialized.
More immediate is the question of what standard the circuits will ap-
ply when they eventually rule on the merits of preemption claims to en-
force the Medicaid Act. In their § 1983 jurisprudence, the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits have interpreted the "equal access" provision to require states to
rely on cost studies, not budgetary concerns, when reducing reimbursement
rates. 199 The Third and Seventh Circuits, on the other hand, have developed
results-oriented tests for enforcing the "equal access" provision.200 Accord-
ing to these circuits, the method states employ to set reimbursement rates is
irrelevant so long as the substantive results are consistent with the Medica-
id Act. While the Eighth and Ninth Circuit's approach is more favorable for
197. See, infra, Part III-C.
198. See Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Svcs. V. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 292 (2006) (holding an
Arkansas law placing automatic liens on court settlements was preempted by the Medicaid Act, and
notably nowhere mentioning "preemption").
199. See Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491, 1496 (9th Cir. 1997); Ark. Med. Soc'y v.
Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 530 (8th Cir. 1993).
200. See Rite Aid of Pa., Inc. v. Houstoun, 171 F.3d 842, 851 (3d Cir. 1999); Methodist Hosps.,
Inc. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1030 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Conn. Ass'n of Health Care Facilities,
2010 WL 2232693 at *9.
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plaintiffs, the results-driven approach of the Third and Seventh Circuits
better addresses whether a state law actually poses an "obstacle" to the
accomplishment of the purposes of the Medicaid Act. Time will tell wheth-
er the circuits import their respective § 1983 tests for determining whether
a state law is preempted by the "equal access" provision or whether they
develop a new test for enforcing the "equal access" provision under the
preemption doctrine.
Another open question is whether the Medicaid Act preempts inade-
quate reimbursement rates in the absence of a state law expressly lowering
them. As noted in Part 111-A, the Supreme Court has given the Supremacy
Clause a broad scope. Reimbursement rates are not codified in any statute
or regulation but rather appear in state Medicaid plans and manuals. Never-
theless, they have a profound effect on provider participation in the Medi-
caid program, which in turn affects how much medical assistance is
available through the program. Like the interpretive guidelines the Su-
preme Court held were preempted in Morales v. Trans World Airlines,
inadequate reimbursement rates pose an obstacle to the accomplishment of
the purposes of a federal law and should be preempted.
While the Supremacy Clause has emerged as a promising alternative
mechanism for enforcing the Medicaid Act, litigation alone is not a solu-
tion to the problem of state Medicaid cutbacks. Medicaid patients and pro-
viders must urge states to improve the efficiency of their Medicaid
programs and explore new revenue streams if the cuts are to subside. The
federal government has recouped billions of dollars by aggressively prose-
cuting False Claims Act violations.201 Thirty-two states have enacted simi-
lar legislation and are capable of prosecuting false claims as well. 202
Additionally, states can increase the efficiency of their Medicaid programs
by expanding their use of managed care structures that result in greater
coordination of care. 203 Finally, states should explore new sources of tax
revenue. Although tax hikes are hard to palate, particularly during a reces-
sion, increased funding is necessary if states are to harness the full advan-
tages of the Medicaid program.
201. See DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN Svcs. & DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND
ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM: ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 1(2010),
http://www.justice.gov/dag/pubdoc/hcfacreport2009.pdf.
202. See States That Have Enacted a False Claims Act, 2009, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUNDATION, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetablejsp?ind=260&cat=4 (last visited Feb. 28,
2011).
203. See KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID AND MANAGED CARE:
KEY DATA, TRENDS AND ISSUES1 (2010), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8046.pdf.
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